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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 
78A-3- 102(3)(j). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
PETERSON'S MECHANICS' LIEN NOTICES WERE NOT TIMELY? 
Standard of Review 
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Peterson Plumbing Supply's 
mechanics' lien notices were timely filed is a question of statutory interpretation and 
therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be given the trial 
court's conclusions." Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, ^ 4 , 182 P.3d 
924, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved for appeal by being addressed in Peterson Plumbing 
Supply's Memorandum in Opposition to Verified Petition to Nullify Liens and 
Memorandum [R. 91-95] and in oral argument before the district court on October 8, 
2008 [R. 287-98]. 
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT 
PETERSON'S MECHANICS' LIENS WERE WRONGFUL LIENS? 
Standard of Review 
Since the facts are not disputed, the issue of whether Peterson Plumbing Supply's 
mechanics' liens were wrongful liens is a question of statutory interpretation and 
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therefore constitutes a question of law for which "no deference need be given the trial 
court's conclusions." Foothill Part LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, ^  4, 182 P.3d 
924, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved for appeal by being addressed in Peterson Plumbing 
Supply's Memorandum in Opposition to Verified Petition to Nullify Liens and 
Memorandum [R. 91-95] and in oral argument before the district court on October 8, 
2008 [R. 287-98]. 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
L UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (2008). 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement 
of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have 
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at 
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, 
contractor, or otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to 
such interest as the owner may have in the property 
II. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008). 
(l)(a)(i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under this 
chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within: 
(A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract if no 
notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the day on which 
a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. (ii) For purposes of this Subsection 
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(1), final completion of the original contract, and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final 
completion of the project, means: (A) if as a result of work performed under the original 
contract a permanent certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of 
issuance of a permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having 
jurisdiction over the construction project; (B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by 
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a 
result of the work performed under the original contract an inspection is required as per 
state-adopted building codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work by 
the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; or (C) if 
with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of occupancy and 
no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes by the local 
government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the date on which 
there remains no substantial work to be completed to finish the work on the original 
contract. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial work 
after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), that 
subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the sole 
purpose of determining: (i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to 
hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1); and (ii) the original contractor's time 
frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a lien under this Subsection (1) for 
that subcontractor's work. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: (i) 
repair work; or (ii) warranty work. 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original contract 
does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding 
payment 1o ensure completion of that work. 
(2)(a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: (i) the 
name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; (ii) 
the name of the person: (A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or (B) to whom 
the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; (iii) the time when: (A) the first 
and last labor or service was performed; or (B) the first and last equipment or material 
was furnished; (iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; (v) the 
name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; (vi) the amount of 
the lien claim; (vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized 
agent; (viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, 
Recording of Documents; and (ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as 
defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance 
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with Section 38-11-107. 
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to hold 
and claim a lien. 
(3)(a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail 
by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: (i) the reputed owner of the real property; 
or (ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien claimant, 
the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, 
using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real property 
assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner 
precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the 
reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing 
the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix). 
III. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (2008). 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful property 
interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, or 
beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a 
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien, or 
notice of interest, or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears in 
the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real 
property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in which the 
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property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of interest, 
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal 
statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by 
the owner of the real property. 
IV. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2 (2008). 
(l)(a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, and 38-9-6 apply to any 
recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this chapter on 
or after May 5, 1997. (b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens 
of record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed, (c) Notwithstanding 
Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the provisions of this chapter applicable to the filing of a 
notice of interest do not apply to a notice of interest filed before May 5, 2008. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in 
accordance with Section 78B-6-1303 or seeking any other relief permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who 
files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case presents two question of statutory interpretation: (1) whether or not a 
mechanics' lien notice is timely filed under Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) when the notice 
of lien is filed within 90 days of the filing of a notice of completion but later than 180 
days after final completion of the original contract; and if not, (2) whether an untimely 
mechanics' lien notice filed by a party entitled to a lien under Utah Code § 38-1-3 (2008) 
renders the mechanics' lien wrongful under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act. 
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Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply is a plumbing materials supplier that 
supplied materials for the construction of Appellee Petitioners' condominiums. Peterson 
Plumbing Supply was not fully paid for the plumbing materials. Certificates of 
occupancy were issued for the condominiums between October and December of 2007. 
These certificates evidence final completion of the original contract. Thereafter, notices 
of completion for the condominiums were filed in July and August of 2008. Mechanics' 
lien notices were also filed by Peterson Plumbing Supply in July and August of 2008. 
Petitioners argued before the district court that Peterson Plumbing Supply's 
mechanics' lien notices were not timely since they were filed more than 180 days after 
final completion of the original contracts even though they were filed within 90 days of 
the filing of the notices of completion. Therefore, according to Petitioners, Peterson 
Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens were wrongful liens based on Foothill Park, LC v. 
Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, 182 P.3d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
Conversely, Peterson Plumbing Supply argued before the district court that its 
mechanics' lien notices were timely since they were filed within 90 days of the filing of 
the notices of completion. In addition, Peterson Plumbing Supply argued that its 
mechanics' liens were not wrongful liens even if the lien notices were not timely filed. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. On September 17, 2008, Petitioners filed their Verified Petition to Nullify Liens 
and Memorandum [R. 1-73]. 
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2. On October 1, 2008, Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Verified Petition to Nullify Liens and Memorandum [R. 91-95]. 
3. On October 8, 2008, Petitioners filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Petition to Nullify Liens [R. 99-103]. 
4. On October 8, 2008, a Hearing was held before Honorable Samuel D. McVey, 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Provo Department, State of Utah, pursuant to Utah 
Code § 38-9-7 (2008), wherein the court granted Petitioners Verified Petition to Nullify 
Liens [R. 98, 271-323]. 
5. On November 14, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Petition to Nullify 
Liens [R. 107-09]. 
6. On December 4, 2008, Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal with this Court. [R. 120]. 
7. On February 18, 2009, this Court granted Peterson Plumbing Supply's Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal [R. 262]. 
III. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
On November 14, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Petition to Nullify 
Liens wherein the court concluded that the mechanics' lien notices filed by Peterson 
Plumbing Supply were not timely filed and that therefore Peterson Plumbing Supply's 
mechanics' liens were wrongful liens pursuant to Utah Code § 38-9-7 (2008). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellee Petitioners are the owners of certain individual condominiums which are 
part of multi-unit buildings located in Pleasant Grove City, Utah [R. 70-73; 320, ffl[ 1-12]. 
2. Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply is a plumbing materials supplier that 
supplied materials for the construction of Petitioners' condominiums [R. 320, ffl[ 21-23]. 
3. The plumbing materials supplied by Peterson Plumbing Supply were supplied 
pursuant to a contract with Pace Plumbing, Inc. [R. 70, f^ 26]. 
4. Petitioner General Construction & Development, Inc. contracted with Pace 
Plumbing, Inc. to do plumbing work on the condominiums [R. 70, ^ j 24]. 
5. Petitioner General Construction & Development, Inc. developed and built the 
condominiums [R. 72, f 2]. 
6. Peterson Plumbing Supply was not fully paid by Pace Plumbing, Inc. for the 
plumbing materials supplied for the construction of Petitioners' condominiums [R. 4, 6, 
8, 9, 13-16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47]. 
7. Peterson Plumbing Supply filed mechanics' lien notices against the condominiums 
as set forth in the following schedule: 
Building 
n 
V 
Cert of Occupancy 
October 11,2007 
November 14, 2007 
Notice of Completion 
July 29, 2008 
July 29, 2008 
Date of Lien 
August 6, 2008 
August 6, 2008 
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w 
X 
y 
October 25, 2007 
December 17, 2007 
December 4, 2007 
July 29, 2008 
August 8, 2008 
August 8, 2008 
August 6, 2008 
July 1, 2008 
August 21, 2008 
[R. 4-49, 93-94, 102,320-22]. 
8. Each mechanics' lien notice was filed within 90 days after a notice of completion 
was filed in the Utah State Construction Registry for each of the condominiums as set 
forth in the foregoing schedule [R. 93-94, 320-22]. 
9. Each mechanics' lien notice was filed more than 180 days after final completion 
of the original contract for each of the condominiums as established by the certificates of 
occupancy and as set forth in the foregoing schedule [R. 93-94, 320-22]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
MECHANICS' LIEN NOTICES FILED BY PETERSON PLUMBING 
SUPPLY WERE NOT TIMELY. 
The district court held that the mechanics' lien notices filed by Peterson Plumbing 
Supply were not timely filed since they were filed more than 180 days after final 
completion of the original contracts. However, Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) provides that 
mechanics' lien notices are required to be filed "within: (A) 180 days after the day on 
which occurs final completion of the original contract if no notice of completion is filed 
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under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of completion is 
filed under Section 38-1-33." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008). 
A notice of completion was filed for each of the condominiums upon which 
Peterson Plumbing Supply filed a mechanics' lien notice. Accordingly, the 180 day 
deadline set forth in section 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) was expressly inapplicable. Since Peterson 
Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were filed within 90 days of the filing of the 
notices of completion, its mechanics' liens were timely. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETERSON 
PLUMBING SUPPLY'S MECHANICS' LIENS WERE WRONGFUL 
LIENS. 
The district court held that Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens were 
wrongful under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act based upon its conclusion that the mechanics' 
lien notices filed by Peterson Plumbing Supply were not timely. However, Peterson 
Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens do not fall within the definition of "wrongful lien" 
under Utah's Wrongful Lien Act since mechanics' liens are "expressly authorized" by 
statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008); Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, If 
52. 
Furthermore, Peterson Plumbing Supply was "entitled to a lien under Section 38-
1-3" of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act regardless of whether its mechanics' liens were 
enforceable. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2008). Accordingly, the district court 
erred by nullify Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens under Utah's Wrongful 
Lien Act. 
10 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
MECHANICS' LIEN NOTICES FILED BY PETERSON PLUMBING 
SUPPLY WERE NOT TIMELY. 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are straightforward. With respect to each 
condominium, Peterson Plumbing Supply filed a mechanics' lien notice within 90 days of 
the filing of a notice of completion but later than 180 days after final completion of the 
original contract [R. 93-94, 320-22]. In finding that Peterson Plumbing Supply's liens 
were untimely, the district court interpreted Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) as (1) creating a 
maximum lien filing deadline of 180 days from final completion of the original contract, 
and (2) providing that the filing of a notice of completion can only reduce, not extend, the 
180 day deadline [R. 279]. 
This interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) is inconsistent with its plain and 
unambiguous language, which provides that mechanics' lien claimants 
shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien 
within: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days 
after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008) (emphasis added). 
Under the rules of this Court, "[w]hen examining a statute, we look first to its 
plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the 
statute. Only if that language is ambiguous do we then turn to a consideration of 
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legislative history and relevant policy considerations." Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 
969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). Furthermore, 
a statute should be applied according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. We must assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be interpreted 
and applied according to its usually accepted meaning. Where the ordinary 
meaning of the terms results in an application that is neither unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the 
statute, it is not the duty of this Court to assess the wisdom of the statutory 
scheme. 
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). 
Interpreting Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) pursuant to the ordinary meaning of its 
literal wording is not confusing, does not render the statute inoperable, and would not 
result in an application of the statute in blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the 
statute (which is to define the time within which a notice of mechanics' lien must be 
filed). Rather, the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) manifests that the 
legislature intended to limit the time within which to file a mechanics' lien notice to 180 
days after final completion of the original contract only when "no notice of completion is 
filed." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (2008). 
If a notice of completion /s filed, the plain and unambiguous language of the 
statute requires that the lien be filed within "90 days after the day on which a notice of 
completion is filed." See id- The accuracy of this interpretation is apparent when Utah 
Code § 38-1-7 (2008) is contrasted with its amended version, Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2009). 
The 2008 version provides that mechanics' lien claimants 
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shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien 
within: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; or (B) 90 days 
after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2008) (emphasis added). In contrast, the 2009 
version provides that mechanics' lien claimants 
shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien 
no later than: [(l)(a)(i)](A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final 
completion of the original contract if no notice of completion is filed under 
Section 38-1-33; or [(l)(a)(i)](B) 90 days after the day on which a notice of 
completion is filed under Section 38-1-33 but not later than the time frame 
established in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2009) (emphasis added).1 
The 2009 version contains a 180 day maximum with a potential notice of 
completion limitation, but the 2008 version does not contain any such limitation. Rather, 
the 180 day period is an alternative to the notice of completion deadline. To hold as the 
district court did requires this Court to amend the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 
(2008) to reflect the policy added to the statute by the legislature in 2009. As noted by 
this Court, "we should give effect to any omission in the [statutory] language by 
presuming that the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \ 
30, 104 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Utah 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
1
 The 2009 version had not yet been enacted when the district court made its 
determination that Peterson Plumbing Supply's liens were not timely under Utah Code § 
38-1-7(2008). 
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Furthermore, this Court acknowledged that u[t]he purpose and intent of Utah's 
Mechanics' Lien Act. . . manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who 
perform the labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building 
or other improvement. Lien statutes should be broadly construed to effectuate that 
purpose." Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ^ 8, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102-03 (Utah 2007) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). In light of this standard, the narrow construction 
adopted by the district court is the antitheses of broadly construing the statute for the 
purpose of protecting laborers and material suppliers. 
Notably the 2009 amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-7 is a substantive change and 
not a mere clarification of the law. While recently interpreting another section of Utah's 
Mechanics' Lien Act, this Court observed the following: 
While it is true that an amendment to an ambiguous statute may indicate a 
legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change 
the law, this is not the general rule, and this view of an amendment should be 
taken only where there is a strong indication that clarification was, in fact, the 
legislative intent. 
Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, ^ 16 (internal quotations and footnote omitted). Utah 
Code §38-1-7 (2008) is not an ambiguous statute: its meaning is clear especially when its 
plain language is contrasted with the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2009). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the legislature intended for Utah Code § 38-1-7 
(2009) to clarify Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008). 
It is undisputed that Peterson Plumbing Supply filed its mechanics' lien notice for 
each of the condominium within 90 days after each applicable notice of completion was 
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filed [R. 93-94, 320-22]. In consideration of the foregoing, the Court should find that 
Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were timely filed under a plain 
language interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) for the following reasons: (1) it is 
presumed that the legislature chose its words advisedly in crafting Utah Code § 38-1-7 
(2008); (2) the language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) is not ambiguous; (3) applying 
Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008) according to its literal wording does not render it confusing, 
inoperable, or contradictory to the purpose of the statute; (4) lien statutes should be 
broadly construed to protect those furnishing labor and materials to construction projects; 
and (5) Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2009) created a substantive change in the law as opposed to 
a mere clarification of the law and is therefore not applicable other than as a contrast to 
demonstrate the plain meaning of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2008). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETERSON 
PLUMBING SUPPLY'S MECHANICS' LIENS WERE WRONGFUL 
LIENS. 
Peterson Plumbing Supply's liens are not wrongful under Utah's Wrongful Lien 
Act regardless of whether the Court finds that its liens were untimely because timing has 
no effect on whether a mechanics5 lien is wrongful. In nullifying Peterson Plumbing 
Supply's liens, the district court found that the Utah Court of Appeals' holding in 
Foothill Park, a seminal interpretation of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3), mandated the 
conclusion that untimely mechanics' liens are wrongful liens [R. 278-80]. 
However, the Court of Appeals failed to consider whether mechanics' liens are 
"expressly authorized by . . . statute." See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT 
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App 113, 182 P.3d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). Since mechanics5 liens are "expressly 
authorized by . . . statute," they fall outside the Wrongful Lien Act's definition of 
"wrongful lien." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008); Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 
UT 69, K 52. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals failed to utilize the rules of statutory 
construction in its analysis of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3). See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, 
Inc., 2008 UT App 113, % 19, 182 P.3d 924, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). A more thorough 
interpretation of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) leads to the conclusion that the Wrongful Lien 
Act is not applicable to this case since Peterson Plumbing Supply was "entitled to a lien 
under Section 38-1-3." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2008). 
A. Peterson Plumbing Supply's Mechanics' Liens are Expressly Authorized by 
Statute. 
The Wrongful Lien Act's definition of "wrongful lien" does not encompass liens 
that are "expressly authorized by . . . statute" such as mechanics' liens. A "wrongful 
lien" is defined by the Wrongful Lien Act as follows: 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of 
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded or filed is not: (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or 
another state or federal statute, (b) authorized by or contained in an order or 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or 
authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008) (emphasis added). This Court recently addressed 
the issue of whether mechanics' liens that have been rendered unenforceable due to 
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noncompliance with the provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act are nevertheless 
"expressly authorized by . . . statute." See Hutterv. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69. 
In Hutter, the parties agreed that "a lien is wrongful if it is not 'expressly 
authorized by . . . statute,'" but disputed "the meaning of the phrase 'expressly 
authorized.'" Id. j^ 46. Dig-It argued "that because the right to file a mechanic's lien is 
granted by statute, all mechanic's liens—even if they ultimately prove unenforceable—are 
expressly authorized by statute and therefore are not wrongful liens." Id. \ 46. On the 
other hand, the Hutters argued "that an unenforceable lien cannot be expressly authorized 
by statute since the statute only allows liens to be recorded that comply with the statutory 
terms." IcL^f46. 
Concluding that "both parties' interpretations [were] plausible readings of the 
statutory text" and "that the phrase 'expressly authorized by . . . statute' [was] 
ambiguous," the Court "turn[ed] to the statute's legislative history for guidance as to the 
legislature's intent." Id f^ 49. After quoting excerpts from a senate floor debate of 
comments made by Senators Carling, Matheson and Moll concerning the intended scope 
of the Wrongful Lien Act, the Court held as follows: 
This legislative history makes clear that the legislature intended that the definition 
of "wrongful lien" should encompass only common law liens. Therefore, we 
conclude that the phrase "not expressly authorized by . . . statute" in the Wrongful 
Lien Act does not include statutorily created liens that ultimately prove 
unenforceable. Because Dig-It filed a mechanic's lien, which is expressly 
authorized by statute, the lien, though unenforceable for the reasons stated above, 
is not wrongful. . . . 
Id \ 50-52. 
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Furthermore, this Court observed that "the Wrongful Lien Act defines 'wrongful 
lien' narrowly." Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., 2005 UT 59, Tf 10, 123 P.3d 
393, 396 (Utah 2005). Interpreting the phrase "authorized by . . . statute" to include only 
enforceable statutory liens would create a very broad wrongful lien definition that, when 
considering the implications of such a broad definition, was clearly not the legislature's 
intent. 
For example, Utah Code § 38-9-7 (2008) provides that district courts "shall 
schedule a hearing within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful 
lien." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-7(3)(b) (2008). A determination of whether a statutory 
lien is enforceable often requires an inquiry into contested facts for which an expedited 
proceeding is impractical and unsuitable. In contrast, determining whether the right to 
file a particular lien is granted by statute without regard to whether the lien is enforceable 
can be done efficiently and effectively on an expedited basis. 
Moreover, the Wrongful Lien Act vests county recorders with authority to "reject 
[the] recording of a lien if the county recorder determines the lien is a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-3(1) (2008). In other words, 
county recorders are authorized to reject liens if they determine that the liens are not 
"expressly authorized by . . . statute." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008). 
In addition, the remedy available to lien claimants whose liens have been rejected 
by the county recorder as wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act provides further 
evidence that the legislature intended for the phrase "authorized by . . . statute" to simply 
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identify liens that were codified by statute without regard to their enforceability. The 
Wrongful Lien Act provides that "[a] lien claimant whose document is rejected [by the 
county recorder] may petition the district court . . . for an expedited determination that the 
lien may be recorded or filed." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-6(1) (2008). However, 
A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a 
contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county recorder. The 
proceeding may not determine the truth of the content of the document nor the 
property or legal rights of the parties beyond the necessary determination whether 
or not the document shall be recorded. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-6(4) (2008) (emphasis added). 
If the legislature expected that district courts would be able to refer solely to the 
"face" of the lien in reviewing a county recorders determination that a "lien [was] a 
wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1," then the legislature necessarily must have 
expected that the courts would be able determine whether a lien was "authorized by . . . 
statute" by examining the "face" of the lien without regard to the "truth of the content" of 
the lien. In many cases, district courts cannot determine whether a statutory lien is 
enforceable without looking past the "face" of the document. In contrast, whether the 
right to file a particular lien is granted by statute can always be determined solely by 
reference to the "face" of the contested document. 
As the foregoing evidences, Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens are not 
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act even if the Court finds that Peterson Plumbing 
Supply failed to timely file its mechanics' lien notices since unenforceable mechanic' 
liens are still "authorized by . . . statute." 
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B. Peterson Plumbing Supply is "Entitled to a Lien under Section 38-1-3." 
Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) provides that the Wrongful Lien Act "does not apply to a 
person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2008). In Foothill Park, 
the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that untimely mechanics' liens are wrongful liens. 
See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, ffif 18-20, 20 n.l 1, 182 P.3d 
924, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
This conclusion was premised on the notion that a mechanics' lien claimant cannot 
be "entitled to a lien" when the lien rights have been voided due to the passage of lien 
deadlines. LLfl 17-20. However, this Court of Appeals interpretation of Utah Code § 
38-9-2(3) is inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction and the legislative 
history of the Wrongful Lien Act. Under the rules of this Court, 
Statutory enactments are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful. Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory language meaning 
and to assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly . . . . We will avoid 
an interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or 
inoperative. 
Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Center, 2004 UT 15, % 16, 89 P.3d 113, 116 (Utah 2004) 
(citations omitted). 
In interpreting Utah Code § 38-9-2(3), the Court of Appeals isolated the phrase 
"entitled to a lien" from the phrase "entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3." See Foothill 
Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 113, Tj 19, 182 P.3d 924, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 
2008). As a result, the Court of Appeals defined entitlement to a mechanics' lien 
20 
generally in the overall context of lien validity under the entire Mechanics' Lien Act, 
including the filing provisions set forth in Utah Code § 38-1-7 and 38-1-11, rather than 
by reference to "section 38-1-3." Id. ^[ 18-20. This interpretation renders the phrase 
"under section 38-1-3" irrelevant, meaningless, superfluous, and inoperative. If the 
legislature intended for entitlement to be defined by compliance with the Wrongful Lien 
Act, then the phrase "under section 38-1-3" is unnecessary. 
Moreover, "statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be 
interpreted as the exclusion of another. Thus, we should give effect to any omission in 
the ordinance language by presuming that the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt 
Lake County, 2004 UT 98, Tf 30, 104 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Utah 2004) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). The legislature chose to define whether a lien claimant is 
"entitled to a lien" by exclusive reference to "section 38-1-3." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
38-9-2(3) (2008). 
Accordingly, it must be presumed that the legislature's omission of any reference 
to the other provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act, or a reference to the Mechanics' Lien 
Act in general, evidences legislative intent to restrict the entitlement inquiry to whether 
the mechanics' lien claimant is identified in section 38-1-3, which is the section of the 
Mechanics Lien Act that defines those who "shall have a lien upon the property": 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or 
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bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (1997).2 
Interpreting the phrase "entitled to a lien" in conjunction with the phrase "under 
section 38-1-3" leads to a three-prong test for determining whether a lien claimant is 
"entitled" to a mechanics' lien: (1) the lien claimant must be identifiable as a contractor, 
subcontractor, licensed architect, or as belonging to one of the other groups identified in 
Utah Code § 38-1-3; (2) the lien claimant must have "rendered service, performed labor, 
or furnished or rented materials or equipment" upon the property; and (3) the work 
performed must have been performed "at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise." See UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-
3 (2008). 
If a mechanics' lien is filed and these conditions are met, then the mechanics' lien 
claimant is "entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-2(3) 
(2008). If a mechanics' lien is filed and these conditions are not met, then the mechanics' 
lien claimant has filed a common law lien disguised as a mechanics' lien since the lien 
claimant is not "entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3." 
2
 Utah Code § 38-1-3 has not been amended since 1994. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 
(2009). 
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Furthermore, statutory provisions should be "interpreted in harmony with other 
provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related 
chapters/' Oman v. Davis Sch. DisU 2008 UT 70, If 35, 194 P.3d 956, 966-67 (Utah 
2008) (citation omitted). This interpretation of Section 38-9-2(3) is consistent with the 
Wrongful Lien Act's definition of "wrongful lien" set forth in Utah Code § 38-9-1(6) 
insofar as the definition limits the applicability of the Wrongful Lien Act to common law 
liens while Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) ensures that the Wrongful Lien Act is still applicable 
to common law liens disguised as mechanics' liens. 
To demonstrate, if an individual is irritated with an elected representative and files 
a mechanics' lien notice on property owned by the elected representative, but that 
individual has not "rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment" to the property, then the individual has filed a common law lien disguised as 
a mechanics' lien. Similarly, if a realtor that has successfully sold a client's property 
files a mechanics' lien on another parcel of property owned by the client upon the failure 
of the client to pay the realtor's commission, then the realtor has filed a common law lien 
disguised as a mechanics' lien. 
In contrast, the Court of Appeals interpretation of entitlement is at odds with this 
Court's interpretation of the Wrongful Lien Act's definition of "wrongful lien." 
Although the definition of "wrongful lien" set forth in Utah Code § 38-9-1(6) "does not 
include statutory liens that ultimately prove unenforceable," see Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 
2009 UT 69, Tf 52, the Court of Appeals interpretation of the scope limitation set forth in 
23 
Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) would apply the Wrongful Lien Act to mechanics' liens that 
ultimately prove unenforceable. See Foothill Park, LC v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App 
113, fflj 18-20, 20 n.l 1, 182 P.3d 924, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals interpretation is also contrary to the legislative 
history of the Wrongful Lien Act. The legislative history laid out by the Court in Hutter 
establishes that the legislature, in originally enacting the Wrongful Lien Act, did not 
intend for the Wrongful Lien Act to be applicable to invalid mechanics' liens. See Hutter 
v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, J^ 50-52. It was for this reason that the original version of the 
Wrongful Lien Act provided, "This chapter is not intended to be applicable to mechanics' 
or materialmen's liens." UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (1985).3 Since then, the legislature 
has never manifested an intent to apply the Wrongful Lien Act to mechanics' lien filed by 
lien claimants identified in Utah Code § 38-1-3 regardless of the enforceability of the 
mechanics' lien claim. 
In addition, the other amendments to the Wrongful Lien Act in 1997 reinforce the 
conclusion that the determination of whether a document is a wrongful lien is to be made 
by a facial review of the documents and not by an adjudication of timeliness, accuracy or 
other factors affecting the validity of the lien. Although the penalty provisions of the 
Since this language does not address the standing of the lien claimant, it leaves open the 
possibility of the filing of common law liens disguised as mechanics liens. Interpreting 
Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) as advocated herein closes that loophole while still preserving the 
overarching purpose of the Wrongful Lien Act: "to impose penalties on those filing 
common law liens on the property of public officials in retaliation for prosecution." See 
Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, ^ 50. 
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original version of the Wrongful Lien Act served as an incentive for those inclined to file 
groundless common law liens to remove those liens after they were filed, it did not 
provide a mechanism by which county recorders could prevent the filing of groundless 
common law liens or for expedited adjudication of wrongful lien claims. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. §38-9-4(1985). 
In 1997, the Wrongful Lien Act was amended to vest county recorders with 
authority to prevent the filing of groundless common law liens, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 
38-9-3 (1997) ("A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the county recorder 
determines the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1."), and to expedite the 
process by which those burdened with groundless common law liens could remove the 
liens from their property, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-7 (1997) ("the court shall 
schedule a hearing within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful 
lien"). 
Under the original version of the Wrongful Lien Act, county recorders would not 
be able to easily identify wrongful liens since they were defined by what was subjectively 
known by the person filing the lien. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (1985) ("A person 
who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property, who causes or 
has caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of the 
county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the document is forged, 
groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
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To aid county recorders (who could now refuse to record wrongful liens) and 
district courts (which now had to determine whether a lien was wrongful at an expedited 
proceeding) in determining whether a particular lien was wrongful, the legislature crafted 
an objective, concise definition of what constitutes a wrongful lien: 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: (al expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court 
of competent jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a 
document signed by the owner of the real property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (1997) (emphasis added). 
In crafting the definition of "wrongful lien" in such a way as to identify common 
law liens by entirely excluding statutory liens from the wrongful lien definition, it was no 
longer necessary for the legislature to explicitly state that the Wrongful Lien Act was 
"not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens" as it did in the 
original version of the Wrongful Lien Act. Nonetheless, the legislature still found it 
desirable to provide that the Wrongful Lien Act "does not apply to a person entitled to a 
lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1." UTAH CODE 
ANN. §38-9-2(3) (1997).4 
In view of the fact that county recorders do not have the expertise to adjudicate the 
timeliness or other factors affecting the validity of a lien, it would make little sense for 
this Court to adopt the logic of Foothill Park by expanding the entitlement inquiry to 
4
 Section 38-9-2(3) has not been substantively amended since 1997. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2009). 
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whether the mechanics' lien claimant has complied with the filing provisions of the 
Mechanics' Lien Act. On the other hand, it makes a great deal of sense for the legislature 
to attempt to prevent the filing of common law liens disguised as mechanics' liens by 
providing that the Wrongful Lien Act is not applicable "to a person entitled to a lien 
under Section 38-1-3." 
In this case, Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were not 
common law liens disguised as mechanics' liens. Peterson Plumbing Supply is (1) a 
plumbing materials supplier that (2) supplied materials for the construction of Petitioners' 
condominiums (3) pursuant to a contract with Pace Plumbing, Inc.5 Since Peterson 
Plumbing Supply "is entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3" and filed its lien pursuant to 
the Mechanics' Lien Act, the Wrongful Lien Act is not applicable even if the Court finds 
that Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' lien notices were not timely filed. 
CONCLUSION 
Peterson Plumbing Supply respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district 
court's determination that Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens were not timely 
filed. In addition, Peterson Plumbing Supply respectfully requests that the Court reverse 
the district court's nullification of Peterson Plumbing Supply's mechanics' liens under 
the Wrongful Lien Act. 
5
 Petitioner General Construction & Development, Inc., the entity that developed and 
built the condominiums, contracted with Pace Plumbing, Inc. to do pluming work on the 
condominiums. 
27 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of December, 2009. 
t>ML^ 
JA T. FARMER 
GARRETT A. WALKER 
Attorneys for Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply 
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